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Abstract
We prove that every multi-player Borel game with bounded and lower-
semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure
strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003),
which shows that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies need
not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous. In addition, if
the range of payoffs is finite, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem
the set of all plays and payoffs that are induced by subgame-perfect 0-
equilibria in pure strategies.
1 Introduction
A multi-player Borel game is a sequential game with perfect information and
without chance moves. The payoff of each player is a function of the infinite
sequence of actions that the players choose. Borel games were introduced by
Gale and Stewart (1953), who studied two-player zero-sum games where the
payoff function is the indicator of some set. In other words, player 1 wins if
the play generated by the players is in a given set of plays, and player 2 wins
otherwise. Martin (1975) proved that if the winning set of player 1 is Borel
measurable, then the game is determined: either player 1 has a winning strategy
or player 2 has a winning strategy. This result implies that every two-player
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zero-sum Borel game has a value, provided the payoff function is bounded and
measurable.
Mertens and Neyman (see Mertens, 1987) used the existence of the value
in two-player zero-sum Borel games to prove that for every ε > 0, every multi-
player non-zero-sum Borel game has a pure ε-equilibrium, provided the payoff
functions are bounded and Borel measurable. Roughly, the ε-equilibrium strate-
gies constructed by Mertens and Neyman are as follows: each player i starts
by following an ε2 -optimal strategy in an auxiliary two-player zero-sum game
Gi, where the payoff is that of player i, player i is the maximizer and the other
players try to minimize player i’s payoff. This goes on as long as no player
deviates. Once some player, say player i, deviates, the other players switch to
an ε2 -optimal strategy of the minimizers in the game Gi.
Thus, the players start by generating a play that yields all of them a high
payoff, and, if a player deviates, he is punished with a low payoff. This con-
struction has the disadvantage that in the punishment phase, the punishers play
without regard to their own payoffs. Therefore, in real-life situations, players
may be reluctant to follow the equilibrium strategies constructed by Mertens
and Neyman.
To deal with such non-credible threats of punishment, Selten (1965, 1973)
introduced the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium. A strategy vector is a
subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium if it induces an ε-equilibrium after any possible
finite history of actions. Ummels (2005) proved the existence of a subgame-
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies for multi-player Borel games when the
payoff function of each player is the indicator of some Borel set. His proof
is based on the following recursive construction. First, one identifies all finite
histories which are a winning position to at least one of the players; that is,
if this finite history occurs, one of the players can ensure that his payoff is 1.
After such finite histories, one instructs every winning player to play his winning
strategy. This leads to a pruned game where all moves which are excluded by
these winning strategies are eliminated. One subsequently identifies winning
positions to the players in this new game, and prunes it in a similar way. The
process repeats itself, until it reaches a stable state. Ummels proves that a
combination of remaining strategies is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the
original game.
In the present paper we show that every multi-player Borel game with
bounded and lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a pure subgame-perfect ε-
equilibrium, for every ε > 0. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and
Vieille (2003) that shows that when the payoff function of at least one player is
not lower-semi-continuous, a pure subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium need not exist.
Our proof makes use of a transfinite construction. A different type of transfinite
construction was used by Maitra and Sudderth (1993) to prove the existence
of the value in a certain class of stochastic games. In Section 4.2 we point at
another possible application of our technique.
The determinacy of Borel games has attracted a lot of attention in descriptive
set theory (see, e.g., Schilling and Vaught (1983) and Kechris (1995)). A rich
literature identifies winning positions for the two players in the class of games
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that are played on graphs (see Gra¨del (2004) for a survey). Two-player zero-
sum Borel games were used in the computer science literature to study reactive
non-terminating programs (see, e.g., Thomas (2002)) and model checking in
µ-calculus (see, e.g., Emerson et al. (2001)), and in economics to show that
measurable tests are manipulable (Shmaya, 2008).
Our result also relates to the game theoretic literature that studies the exis-
tence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in various classes of infinite games, see,
e.g., Solan and Vieille (2003), Mashiah-Yaakovi (2009), Kuipers et al. (2008) or
Flesch et al. (2010). In particular, our result generalizes results in Flesch et al.
(2010).
The paper is organized as follows. The model and the main result appear
in Section 2. Section 3 contains the proof of the main result, and Section 4
concludes with comments.
2 The Model and the Main Result
Definition 1. An n-player Borel game is a quadruple (I, A, i, (uj)j∈I) where
I = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players, A is a non-empty set1of actions, i :⋃
t∈NA
t−1 → I is a function2 that assigns an active player to each finite se-
quence of actions, and uj : AN → R is the payoff function, for every player
j ∈ I.
A Borel game is a sequential game, where at each stage t ∈ N, knowing the
past history ht = (a1, a2, . . . , at−1), player i(ht), the active player at stage t,
chooses an action at ∈ A. The payoff to each player j ∈ I is uj(a1, a2, . . .). The
description of the game is common knowledge among the players.
Comment 2. The assumption that the action set is the same for all players
and for all stages is made for simplicity of notations only. Nothing that is said
below would be affected if the action sets would depend on the player, on the
stage, or in fact on the whole past play.
The set of finite histories where player j is the active player is:
Hj = i−1(j) = {h ∈ ∪t∈NAt−1 : i(h) = j} .
The set of all finite histories is then H = ∪j∈IHj .
Definition 3. A (pure) strategy for player j is a function σj : Hj → A. A
(pure) strategy profile is a vector of strategies σ = (σj)j∈I .
In the present paper we discuss only pure strategies, and by a strategy or
by a strategy profile we will always mean a pure one. We denote by Σj the
strategy space of player j, and by Σ = ×j∈IΣj the set of all strategy profiles.
1The set of actions A may be finite or infinite.
2By convention, the initial history is the empty history h1 = ∅, and A0 = {∅}.
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An infinite sequence of actions p ∈ AN is called a play. Every strategy profile
σ ∈ Σ determines a unique play p(σ) = (at)t∈N ∈ AN recursively as follows:
a1 = σi(∅)(∅),
at = σi(ht)(ht), where ht = (a1, a2, . . . , at−1), ∀t ∈ N.
We denote by uj(σ) = uj(p(σ)) the payoff of player j when the players follow
σ.
For j ∈ I we denote by −j = I \ {j} the set of all players excluding j. If σ
is a strategy profile and j is a player, then σ−j = (σk)k∈I\{j}.
Definition 4. Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σj∗)j∈I is an ε-equilibrium if
uj(σ∗) ≥ uj(σ−j∗ , σj)− ε for every player j ∈ I and every strategy σj ∈ Σj.
Throughout the paper we endow A with the discrete topology, and AN with
the product topology.
The two-player game is called zero-sum if u1(p)+u2(p) = 0 for every p ∈ AN.
The result of Martin (1975) implies that in zero-sum games, an ε-equilibrium
exists for every ε > 0 under quite general conditions.
Theorem 5. If the game is zero-sum, and if u1 is bounded and Borel measur-
able, then an ε-equilibrium exists for every ε > 0.
This results implies the existence of an ε-equilibrium in every multi-player
Borel game.
Theorem 6 (Mertens and Neyman, see Mertens, 1987). If uj is bounded and
Borel measurable for every player j ∈ I, then an ε-equilibrium exists for every
ε > 0.
A stronger notion of equilibrium is the notion of subgame-perfect equilib-
rium. Every finite history h = (a1, a2, . . . , al) ∈ H, together with a strategy
profile σ, determines an infinite play p(σ | h) = (bt)t∈N ∈ AN recursively as
follows:
bt = at, 1 ≤ t ≤ l,
bt = σi(ht)(ht), where ht = (b1, b2, . . . , bt−1), l < t.
This is the play that σ generates given that the history h occurred. We denote
by uj(σ | h) = uj(p(σ | h)) the payoff of player j at this play.
Definition 7. Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σj∗)j∈I is a subgame-perfect
ε-equilibrium if for every finite history h ∈ H, one has
uj(σ∗ | h) ≥ uj((σ−j∗ , σj) | h)− ε ∀j ∈ I ∀σj ∈ Σj .
In other words, every finite history h defines the subgame that starts at h
— namely, the game with payoff function uj(· | h) for player j ∈ I. A strategy
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profile is a subgame perfect ε-equilibrium if it induces an ε-equilibrium in all
subgames.
We say that a finite history h = (at)lt=1 is a prefix of the play p = (bt)t∈N ∈
AN, or that p is an extension of h, if at = bt for every t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, and we
denote it by h ≺ p. We say that a finite history h = (at)lt=1 is a prefix of the
finite history h′ = (bt)mt=1, or that h
′ is an extension of h, if l ≤ m and at = bt
for every t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, and we denote it by h  h′.
When A is endowed with the discrete topology, and AN is endowed with the
product topology, then a sequence (pk)k∈N of plays converges to a limit p if and
only if every prefix h of p is a prefix of all the plays (pk)k∈N except possibly of
finitely many of them.
Definition 8. The payoff function uj is lower-semi-continuous if for every se-
quence (pk)k∈N of plays in AN that converges to a limit p one has
lim inf
k→∞
uj(pk) ≥ uj(p).
Note that every lower-semi-continuous function is Borel measurable. Our
main result is the following.
Theorem 9. If the payoff function uj is bounded and lower-semi-continuous
for every player j ∈ I, then the game admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium
for every ε > 0.
This result is tight, in the sense that if the payoff function of one of the
players is not lower-semi-continuous, then the game need not admit a subgame-
perfect ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0 (see Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003)).
3 Proof of Theorem 9 and a Folk Theorem
We first argue that we can assume w.l.o.g. that the range of the payoff functions
(uj)j∈I is finite. Indeed,3 let ûj(p) be the highest multiple of ε that is strictly
smaller than uj(p):
ûj(p) = εbu
j(p)
ε
c.
Note that if uj is bounded then ûj has finite range, and if uj is lower-semi-
continuous then so is ûj . Moreover, every subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in the
game with payoff functions (ûj)j∈I is a subgame-perfect 2ε-equilibrium in the
game with payoff functions (uj)j∈I . Therefore, for the proof of Theorem 9, we
may assume w.l.o.g. that the payoff functions have finite range.
From now on, we assume that the payoff functions (uj)j∈I have finite range
and are lower-semi-continuous. We will prove under these assumptions that
there exists a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium. In the proof, we use the finiteness
of the range of the payoffs to have a maximal payoff and a minimal payoff
in every non-empty subset of payoffs. The lower-semi-continuity of the payoff
3Below, bxc is the largest integer that is strictly smaller than x, for every real number x.
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functions, on the other hand, will be used to obtain the following property: when
the players are supposed to play according to a strategy profile σ = (σ`)`∈I , if
some player j cannot deviate profitably by not playing the action prescribed
by σj finitely many times, then he cannot deviate profitably by disobeying σj
infinitely many times.
3.1 Constructing some sequences
In this subsection we define for every finite history h ∈ H and every ordinal ξ,
(a) a real number αξ(h), and (b) a set Pξ(h) of plays. The sequence (αξ(h))ξ will
be a non-decreasing sequence of lower bounds to the set of subgame-perfect 0-
equilibrium payoffs for player i(h) in the subgame that starts at h. The sequence
(Pξ(h))ξ will be a non-increasing (by inclusion) sequence of sets of plays; a play
that is not in Pξ(h) cannot be induced by a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in
the subgame that starts at h.
We will in fact prove a Folk theorem: maxξ αξ(h) will be the minimal
subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium payoff of player i(h) in the subgame that starts
at h, and a play will be in all the sets (Pξ(h))ξ if and only if it is induced by
some subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in the subgame that starts at h.
For every finite history h ∈ H set:
P1(h) := {p ∈ AN : h ≺ p}, (1)
α1(h) := min
p∈P1(h)
ui(h)(p). (2)
The set P1(h) consists of all plays that extend h, and the quantity α1(h) is a
naive lower bound to the set of subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium payoffs in the
subgame that starts at h.
If h = (at)lt=1 is a finite history with length l, and a ∈ A, we denote by
(h, a) = (a1, a2, . . . , al, a) the finite history of length l+1 that starts with h and
ends with a.
For every successor ordinal ξ + 1 and every finite history h ∈ H define
αξ+1(h) := max
a∈A
min
p∈Pξ(h,a)
ui(h)(p), (3)
Pξ+1(h) :=
{
p ∈ ∪a∈APξ(h, a) : ui(h)(p) ≥ αξ+1(h)
}
. (4)
As we will show, a play that is not in Pξ(h, a) cannot be induced by a subgame-
perfect 0-equilibrium in the subgame that starts at (h, a). Therefore, when
player i(h) considers the subgame that starts at h, he can ignore the plays that
are not in ∪a∈APξ(h, a). In particular, when player i(h) plays optimally at h, the
quantity αξ+1(h) is a lower bound to his payoff in subgame-perfect 0-equilibria
in the subgame that starts at h, and a play that is not in Pξ+1(h) cannot be
induced by a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in this subgame.
For every limit ordinal ξ and every finite history h ∈ H define
Pξ(h) := ∩λ<ξ Pλ(h), (5)
αξ(h) := min
p∈Pξ(h)
ui(h)(p). (6)
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As we will show, a play that is not in Pλ(h) for some λ < ξ cannot be induced
by a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in the subgame that starts at h. Therefore,
the same holds for any play that is not in Pξ(h). Moreover, the quantity αξ(h)
is then a lower bound to the payoff of player i(h) in subgame-perfect 0-equilibria
in the subgame that starts at h.
3.2 Properties of the sequences (αξ(h))ξ and (Pξ(h))ξ
We first list a few simple properties of the sequences (αξ)ξ and (Pξ)ξ that easily
follow from the definitions and that we will use later.
Lemma 10. Let ξ be an ordinal and let h be a finite history.
1. αξ(h) = minp∈Pξ(h) u
i(h)(p). In particular, there is a play p ∈ Pξ(h) such
that ui(h)(p) = αξ(h).
2. Let a ∈ A be an action that achieves the maximum in the right-hand side
of (3). If p ∈ Pξ(h, a) then p ∈ Pξ+1(h).
3. Suppose that ξ = 1 or ξ is a limit ordinal. Let p ∈ Pξ(h) and let h′ be a
finite history that satisfies h  h′ ≺ p. Then p ∈ Pξ(h′).
Proof. Part 1 follows from the definitions (2) and (6) for ξ = 1 and for limit
ordinals, and from the definitions (3) and (4) for successor ordinals.
Part 2 follows from the definitions (3) and (4).
We now prove Part 3. For ξ = 1, the claim follows from definition (1). So,
assume that ξ is a limit ordinal. We will show that p ∈ Pξ(h, a), where a ∈ A is
the action in p right after h. Let λ be an ordinal such that λ < ξ. As λ+ 1 < ξ,
it follows from definition (5) that p ∈ Pλ+1(h). Hence, by definition (4), we
have p ∈ Pλ(h, a). Since λ < ξ was arbitrary, it follows that p ∈ Pξ(h, a). The
proof for any finite history h′ that satisfies h ≺ h′ ≺ p follows by induction.
The following theorem states additional properties of the sequences (αξ(h))ξ
and (Pξ(h))ξ, which play a crucial role in the proof of Theorem 9.
Theorem 11. The following holds for every h ∈ H:
1. The set Pξ(h) is not empty for every ordinal ξ.
2. The sequence (Pξ(h))ξ is monotonic non-increasing (by inclusion).
3. The sequence (αξ(h))ξ is monotonic non-decreasing.
Before proving the theorem we define another property of plays, ξ-monotonicity,
that will be used in the proof of Theorem 11.
Definition 12. Let h be a finite history, and p a play that extends h. The play
p is called ξ-monotonic at h if the sequence (Pξ(h′))hh′≺p is non-increasing:
Pξ(h′) ⊇ Pξ(h′′), ∀h′, h′′ such that h  h′  h′′ ≺ p.
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Proof of Theorem 11. The proof is by transfinite induction, and it will follow
once we prove the following claims:
Claim 1: P1(h) 6= ∅ for every h ∈ H. Moreover, every p ∈ P1(h) is 1-
monotonic at h.
Claim 2: For every ordinal ξ, if Pξ(h) 6= ∅ for every h ∈ H, then Pξ+1(h) 6= ∅
for every h ∈ H.
Claim 3: For ξ = 1 and for every limit ordinal ξ we have αξ+1(h) ≥ αξ(h)
and Pξ+1(h) ⊆ Pξ(h) for every h ∈ H.
Claim 4: If αξ+1(h) ≥ αξ(h) and Pξ+1(h) ⊆ Pξ(h) for every h ∈ H, then
αξ+2(h) ≥ αξ+1(h) and Pξ+2(h) ⊆ Pξ+1(h) for every h ∈ H.
Claim 5: For every limit ordinal ξ, every ordinal λ < ξ, and every h ∈ H,
one has αξ(h) ≥ αλ(h) and Pξ(h) ⊆ Pλ(h).
Claim 6: For every limit ordinal ξ and every h ∈ H one has Pξ(h) 6= ∅.
Moreover, there is a play p ∈ Pξ(h) that is ξ-monotonic at h.
As we will see, Claims 1-5 easily follow from the definitions. The proof of claim
6 is the challenging part of the whole proof. The existence of ξ-monotonic plays
in Claims 1 and 6 is needed for the inductive step of the proof of Claims 3 and
6.
Proof of Claim 1: This claim follows from the definitions (1) and (2).
Proof of Claim 2: This claim follows from the definitions (3) and (4).
Proof of Claim 3: By the induction hypothesis (Claims 1 and 6) there is a play
p̂ ∈ Pξ(h) that is ξ-monotonic at h. Let a0 be the first action in p̂ after h. Then
Pξ(h) ⊇ Pξ(h, a0). Therefore, by (3) and (6),
αξ+1(h) = max
a∈A
min
p∈Pξ(h,a)
ui(h)(p) ≥ min
p∈Pξ(h,a0)
ui(h)(p)
≥ min
p∈Pξ(h)
ui(h)(p) = αξ(h),
and the first part of the claim holds.
We now prove that Pξ+1(h) ⊆ Pξ(h). For ξ = 1 this follows trivially from
(1). We therefore assume that ξ is a limit ordinal. Let p ∈ Pξ+1(h). By (4) we
have p ∈ Pξ(h, a0), where a0 is the first action in p after h. By (5), p ∈ Pλ(h, a0)
for every ordinal λ < ξ. By the first part of Claim 3 and by Claim 5 applied to
ξ,
ui(h)(p) ≥ αξ+1(h) ≥ αξ(h) ≥ αλ+1(h),
so that by (4), p ∈ Pλ+1(h) for every λ < ξ. It follows by (5) that p ∈ Pξ(h), as
desired.
Proof of Claim 4: This claim follows from the definitions (3) and (4).
Proof of Claim 5: The claim Pξ(h) ⊆ Pλ(h) follows from definition (5). Hence,
part 1 of Lemma 10 implies αξ(h) ≥ αλ(h).
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Proof of Claim 6: Fix a limit ordinal ξ. We will prove that if Claims 1-6 hold
for every ordinal λ smaller than ξ, and Claim 5 holds for ξ as well, then Claim
6 also holds for the ordinal ξ. The following lemma follows from Claims 3-5.
Lemma 13. For every finite history h, the sequence (αλ(h))λ≤ξ is monotonic
non-decreasing, and the sequence (Pλ(h))λ≤ξ is monotonic non-increasing (by
inclusion).
For every finite history h, we define
α˜ξ(h) := max
λ<ξ
αλ(h). (7)
By Lemma 13, α˜ξ(h) ≤ αξ(h).
Fix a finite history h. We are going to generate a play that extends h, and
we will show that it is in Pξ(h) and that it is ξ-monotonic at h. The play will
be generated in iterations; the output of the first iteration is an extension of h,
and the output of each subsequent iteration extends the output of the previous
iteration. The construction in odd iterations differs from the construction in
even iterations. We will then prove that an infinite play is generated after an
even number of iterations. Finally we will show that this play is in Pξ(h) and
that it is ξ-monotonic at h.
Odd iterations:
Let h1 be the finite history at the beginning of the odd iteration. For the first
iteration, h1 = h. For all other odd iterations, it is the finite history generated
by the previous even iteration.
Consider the following algorithm that generates a finite history or a play
that extends h1.
1. Let ξ1 < ξ be a successor ordinal that satisfies α˜ξ(h1) = αξ1(h1). Such
an ordinal exists because (a) the range of payoffs is finite, and (b) every
nonempty set of ordinals has a minimal element.
2. Let a1 be an action of player i(h1) that achieves the maximum in (3) for
h1 and ξ1, that is,
αξ1(h1) = min
p∈Pξ1−1(h1,a1)
ui(h1)(p).
Set h2 = (h1, a1).
3. If ξ1 > 1, let ξ2 ≥ ξ1 − 1 be the minimal ordinal that satisfies α˜ξ(h2) =
αξ2(h2). Note that because ξ is a limit ordinal, ξ2 < ξ.
4. If ξ2 is a successor ordinal, let a2 be an action of player i(h2) that achieves
the maximum in (3) for h2 and ξ2, that is,
αξ2(h2) = min
p∈Pξ2−1(h2,a2)
ui(h2)(p).
Set h3 = (h1, a1, a2).
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5. Continue this way to create a sequence (h1, ξ1, a1, h2, ξ2, a2, . . .). The it-
eration ends when either ξm = 1 or ξm is a limit ordinal; in this case, the
output of the odd iteration is the finite history hm = (h1, a1, a2, . . . , am−1).
If ξm > 1 is a successor ordinal for every m ∈ N, the iteration never ends.
Note that every ordinal ξk generated along an odd iteration satisfies ξk < ξ.
As the next lemma states, odd iterations are finite.
Lemma 14. There is m ∈ N such that either ξm = 1 or ξm is a limit ordinal.
Proof. Assume that the algorithm never terminates: ξm > 1 is a successor
ordinal for every m ∈ N, so that the algorithm generates an infinite sequence
(h1, ξ1, a1, h2, ξ2, a2, . . .).
We first argue that for every m ∈ N one has4
Pξm(hm) ⊇ Pξm−1(hm+1) ⊇ Pξm+1(hm+1). (8)
Indeed, the left-hand side inclusion holds by Lemma 10(2), whereas the
right-hand side inclusion holds by Lemma 13 and since ξm − 1 ≤ ξm+1.
By (8), for every player j
min
p∈Pξm (hm)
uj(p) ≤ min
p∈Pξm−1(hm+1)
uj(p) ≤ min
p∈Pξm+1 (hm+1)
uj(p). (9)
Because the payoffs are discrete, the inequalities in (9) can be strict only
finitely many times, for every player j. That is, there is M ∈ N sufficiently
large such that for every player j ∈ I and every m ≥M ,
min
p∈Pξm (hm)
uj(p) = min
p∈Pξm−1(hm+1)
uj(p) = min
p∈Pξm+1 (hm+1)
uj(p). (10)
Let m,m′ be two integers satisfying (a) M ≤ m < m′, and (b) i(hm) =
i(hm′). By repeated use of Eq. (10),
α˜ξ(hm) = αξm(hm) = min
p∈Pξm (hm)
ui(hm)(p) = min
p∈Pξ
m′−1−1(hm′ )
ui(hm)(p)
= min
p∈Pξ
m′ (hm′ )
ui(hm)(p) = αξm′ (hm′) = α˜ξ(hm′). (11)
Because
αξm′−1−1(hm′) = min
p∈Pξ
m′−1−1(hm′ )
ui(hm)(p) = αξm′ (hm′),
it follows that ξm′ = ξm′−1 − 1. Because this equality holds for every m′
sufficiently large, there is m such that either ξm = 1 or ξm is a limit ordinal, as
desired.
4Because ξm is a successor ordinal, the ordinal ξm − 1 is well defined.
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Observe that inclusion (8) holds as long as ξm is a successor ordinal, and
therefore it holds all along the odd iteration.
Even iterations:
Let h1 be the finite history that is the output of the previous odd iteration,
and denote by λ the last ordinal ξm generated by the previous odd iteration.
In particular, either λ = 1 or λ is a limit ordinal, and λ < ξ. Moreover,
α˜ξ(h1) = αλ(h1).
By the induction hypotheses of Claim 1 (if λ = 1) or Claim 6 applied to λ
(if 1 < λ < ξ), there is a play p ∈ Pλ(h1) that is λ-monotonic at h1.
By the definition of α˜ξ(h′), we have α˜ξ(h′) ≥ αλ(h′) for every prefix h′ of p
that extends h1. If α˜ξ(h′) = αλ(h′) for every prefix h′ of p that extends h1, the
even iteration is infinite and its output is p. Otherwise, the output of the even
iteration is the shortest prefix h′ of p that extends h1 for which α˜ξ(h′) > αλ(h′),
and in this case we proceed with the next odd iteration.
Denote by p∗ the play that extends h, which is generated by (a possibly
infinite) use of odd and even iterations. We will now show that p∗ is ξ-monotonic
at h and that it is in Pξ(h).
Denote by (hm)m∈N all finite prefixes of p∗ that extend h, so that h1 = h.
Denote by ξm the ordinal that is attached to hm in the construction of p∗; it
is a successor ordinal along odd iterations, and a limit ordinal or 1 along even
iterations.
Lemma 15. The play p∗ is ξ-monotonic at h.
Proof. Let m ≥ 1, and let p ∈ Pξ(hm+1). We will prove that p ∈ Pξ(hm).
By (5) it follows that p ∈ Pτ (hm+1), for every τ < ξ, and in particular p ∈
Pξm+1(hm+1). We deduce that p ∈ Pξm(hm); if hm is in an odd iteration (and it
is not the last history of that odd iteration) this follows from (8), while if hm+1
is in an even iteration (and it is not the last history of that even iteration) this
follows because then ξm = ξm+1 (both are equal to the ordinal λ of that even
iteration) and the part of the play added in an even iteration is ξm-monotonic.
Because p ∈ Pξm(hm) we have
ui(hm)(p) ≥ αξm(hm) = α˜ξ(hm) ≥ ατ+1(hm),
for every ordinal τ < ξ. By (4) this implies that p ∈ Pτ+1(hm) for every τ < ξ,
so that by (5) we have p ∈ Pξ(hm).
We are now ready to prove Claim 6.
Lemma 16. p∗ ∈ Pξ(h).
Proof. Suppose first that the number of iterations is finite, so that the last even
iteration is infinite. Denote by hm the history at the beginning of the last even
block. Then ξm = ξm+1 = · · · =: λ. We will show that p∗ ∈ Pξ(hm), so that by
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the ξ-monotonicity of p∗ (Lemma 15) it will follow that p∗ ∈ Pξ(h), as desired.
Note that by the definition of even blocks, α˜ξ(hm′) = αλ(hm′) for every m′ ≥ m.
Assume to the contrary that p∗ 6∈ Pξ(hm). Let τ be the smallest ordinal such
that p∗ 6∈ Pτ (hm′) for some m′ ≥ m. Note that τ > λ: because p∗ ∈ Pλ(hm),
by Lemma 10(3) we have p∗ ∈ Pλ(hm′) for every m′ ≥ m. By definition (5),
τ cannot be a limit ordinal, so that τ is a successor ordinal. It follows that
p∗ ∈ Pτ−1(hm′) for every m′ ≥ m. To derive a contradiction we argue that p∗ ∈
Pτ (hm′) for every m′ ≥ m. Indeed, for every m′ ≥ m, because p∗ ∈ Pλ(hm′),
α˜ξ(hm′) = αλ(hm′), and ξ > τ , it follows that
ui(hm′ )(p∗) ≥ αλ(hm′) = α˜ξ(hm′) ≥ ατ (hm′),
so that by definition (4) we have p∗ ∈ Pτ (hm′), as claimed.
We now show that the number of iterations cannot be infinite. Note that
Pξm(hm) ⊇ Pξm+1(hm+1) for every m ∈ N. Indeed, if hm is in an odd iteration
then the inclusion follows from (8); if hm and hm+1 are both in the same even
iteration then this inclusion holds because the part of the play added in this
even iteration is ξm-monotonic and ξm = ξm+1; in case hm is the last history of
an even iteration and hm+1 is the first history of the subsequent odd iteration,
then the construction implies that ξm+1 > ξm, so that the inclusion follows by
Pξm(hm) ⊇ Pξm(hm+1) and Lemma 13.
It follows that for every m ∈ N and every player j,
min
p∈Pξm (hm)
uj(p) ≤ min
p∈Pξm+1 (hm+1)
uj(p). (12)
Because the range of the payoffs is finite, the inequality (12) can be strict only
finitely many times, for every player j.
Let hm+1 be the last finite history of an even iteration (so it is also the first
history of the next odd iteration). Then the finite history hm is generated by
the same even iteration as hm+1, and
min
p∈Pξm (hm)
ui(hm+1)(p) ≤ min
p∈Pξm (hm+1)
ui(hm+1)(p) < min
p∈Pξm+1 (hm+1)
ui(hm+1)(p)
(13)
where the weak inequality holds because the part of p∗ generated by the even
iteration is ξm-monotonic, and the strict inequality holds because hm+1 is the
last finite history of an even iteration. In particular, by Eq. (12), since the
range of the payoffs is finite and since there are finitely many players, Eq. (13)
can hold only finitely many times, so there can be only finitely many even
iterations.
The proof of Theorem 11 is now complete.
The next theorem states that the process of defining the sequences (αξ(h))ξ
and (Pξ(h))ξ reaches a fixed point.
Theorem 17. There is an ordinal ξ∗ such that for every finite history h ∈ H
we have αξ∗(h) = αξ∗+1(h), and Pξ∗(h) = Pξ∗+1(h) 6= ∅.
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In section 4.1 we provide an example which shows that ξ∗ can be any ordinal.
Proof. Denote by ρ the cardinality of the set of functions that assign to each
finite history h ∈ H a subset of AN. For every finite history h ∈ H, the sequence
(Pξ(h))ξ is non-increasing. Moreover, if Pξ(h) = Pξ+1(h) for every h ∈ H then
Pξ+1(h) = Pξ+2(h) for every h ∈ H, which implies that Pξ(h) = Pτ (h) for
every h ∈ H and every ordinal τ > ξ. It follows that for every ordinal ξ whose
cardinality is larger than ρ, Pξ(h) = Pξ+1(h) for every h ∈ H.
By Lemma 10(1) it follows that for each such ordinal ξ, αξ(h) = αξ+1(h) for
every h ∈ H, and the result follows.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 9
We now construct a strategy profile σ∗ = (σ
j
∗)j∈I , and show that it is a subgame-
perfect 0-equilibrium.
For the initial history ∅ choose an arbitrary play p(∅) ∈ Pξ∗(∅). For every
other finite history h = (al)l<t, denote by h− = (al)l<t−1 the prefix of h ex-
cluding the last action, and by i(h−) the active player at h−. Choose a play
p(h) ∈ Pξ∗(h) that extends h and that satisfies
ui(h
−)(p(h)) = min
p∈Pξ∗ (h)
ui(h
−)(p). (14)
If player j deviates, and h is the finite history right after the deviation (so that
j = i(h−)), then p(h) is a play at h that minimizes player’s j’s payoff within
Pξ∗(h).
Let σj∗ be the following strategy: Follow the play p(∅) as long as all other
players follow p(∅). Suppose that at stage t1 player j1 deviates from p(∅). From
stage t1 + 1 and on follow the play p(ht1+1) as long as all other players follow
p(ht1+1). Suppose that at stage t2 > t1 player j2 deviates from p(ht1+1). From
stage t2 + 1 and on follow the play p(ht2+1) as long as all other players follow
p(ht2+1). Continue this way.
We now show that σ∗ is a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium. To this end, we
fix a finite history h ∈ H, and we show for an arbitrary player j that
uj(σ−j∗ , σ
j | h) ≤ uj(σ∗ | h), ∀σj ∈ Σj .
Let σj ∈ Σj be any strategy of player j. Let p∗ = p(σ∗ | h) be the play
induced by σ∗ given h. This is the play that is generated given h if player j does
not deviate. Let p = p(σ−j∗ , σj | h) be the play given h when player j deviates
to σj .
Denote by t1, t2, . . . the stages where σj and σ
j
∗ differ along p; in those stages
all the players observe the deviations of player j. The sequence (tk)k may be
finite or infinite. Denote by pk = p(htk+1) the play that the players start to
follow from stage tk + 1 on, for each k.
We complete the proof by showing that
uj(p) ≤ uj(p∗). (15)
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It is sufficient to show that
uj(pk) ≤ uj(p∗), ∀k. (16)
Indeed, if σj and σj∗ differ only finitely many times along p, Eq. (15) follows
from Eq. (16) applied to the last k; if σj and σj∗ differ infinitely many times
along p, then the sequence (pk)k∈N converges to p, so that Eq. (15) follows
from Eq. (16) and the lower-semi-continuity of uj . This is the only place in the
proof where the lower-semi-continuity of the payoff functions is used.
The proof of (16) is by induction on k. Due to the construction and to
Lemma 10(3), we have p∗ ∈ Pξ∗(h). Hence, Lemma 10(3) and Eq. (14) imply
uj(p1) ≤ uj(p∗). For every k ≥ 1, because pk ∈ Pξ∗(htk), and by Lemma 10(3)
and Eq. (14), uj(pk+1) ≤ uj(pk), which is at most uj(p∗) by the induction
hypothesis. The proof is now complete.
3.4 A Folk Theorem
Our construction enables us to characterize the set of plays that can arise in a
subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in the game with discrete payoffs.
Theorem 18. A play p is induced by some subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium if and
only if p ∈ Pξ∗(∅).
It follows from this result that for every h ∈ H, αξ∗(h) is the lowest subgame-
perfect 0-equilibrium payoff in the subgame that starts at h, and that p is the
play induced by some subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium if and only if ui(h)(p) ≥
αξ∗(h) for every prefix h of p.
Proof. If p is in Pξ∗(∅), then the construction in Section 3.3 shows that it is the
play that is induced by some subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium.
To see that the converse is true, we show that if σ∗ is a subgame-perfect
0-equilibrium, then p(σ∗ | h) is in Pξ(h), for every ordinal ξ and every finite
history h. The proof is by transfinite induction on ξ.
Because every play that extends h is in P1(h), the claim holds for ξ = 1.
Suppose now that the claim holds for a given ordinal ξ. Let h be any finite
history. Because the claim holds for ξ, the play p(σ∗ | (h, a)) is in Pξ(h, a) for
every action a. Therefore, with respect to σ∗, the payoff to player i(h) is at
least αξ+1(h) in the subgame that starts at h. This implies that p(σ∗ | h) is in
Pξ+1(h), for every h.
Finally, the definition of Pξ(h) for limit ordinals ξ implies that if p(σ∗ | h)
is in Pλ(h) for every ordinal λ < ξ, then it is also in Pξ(h).
4 Concluding Remarks
4.1 How large can ξ∗ be?
A natural question is whether the ordinal ξ∗ of Theorem 17 is at most the first
infinite ordinal ω, or whether it can be larger than ω. As the following example
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shows, ξ∗ can be any ordinal. For simplicity of exposition, in this example the
set of actions is history dependent.
Let τ be any ordinal. Roughly speaking, we consider a game in which two
players I and II choose a non-increasing sequence (at)t of ordinals, with a0 = τ ,
according to the following rules. If the current ordinal at−1 is a successor ordinal,
then player I chooses at from {at−1, at−1 − 1}. If the current ordinal at−1 is a
limit ordinal, then player II chooses any ordinal at smaller than at−1. Finally, if
at−1 = 1 then all further choices (am)m≥t will be 1 as well. The payoff for player
I equals 1 if the sequence (at)t eventually reaches 1 and equals 0 otherwise. The
payoff for player II equals 0 for every play.
The idea of this game is that player I can make sure that the sequence
(at)t eventually reaches 1 and thereby obtain the best payoff 1, but the number
of stages needed to reach 1 depends on player II. More precisely, if player I,
whenever he is the active player, always lowers the current ordinal by 1, then
at < at−1 holds as long as at−1 > 1. Since there is no infinite sequence of
decreasing ordinals, this strategy of player I guarantees that at = 1 for some
t ∈ N, regardless the actions that player II chooses. Still, if λ1 and λ2 are two
limit ordinals such that λ2 < λ1 ≤ τ , there is no bound on the number of stages
needed to descend from λ1 to λ2, as player II can choose the ordinal λ2 + k for
any k ∈ N when the current ordinal is λ1. As we will show, one needs τ steps
in our iterative method to realize that the sequence (at)t eventually reaches 1
whatever ordinals player II chooses.
Formally we consider the following two-player Borel game. For any history5
h = (a0, a1, . . . , at−1), the active player i(h) and his action set A(h) are defined
as follows:
• If at−1 is a successor ordinal: i(h) = I and A(h) = {at−1, at−1 − 1}.
• If at−1 is a limit ordinal: i(h) = II and A(h) = {all ordinals smaller than
at−1}.
• If at−1 = 1: i(h) = I and A(h) = {1}.6
Let W denote the set of all plays p = (at)t≥0 such that at = 1 for some t. For
an arbitrary play p, the payoff to player I is as follows: uI(p) = 1 if p ∈ W ,
and uI(p) = 0 otherwise. The payoff to player II is uII(p) = 0 for every play p.
Because there is no infinite strictly decreasing sequence of ordinals, the payoff
functions are lower-semi-continuous.
We claim that for every finite history h = (a0, a1, . . . , at−1):
(a) If ξ < at−1 and at−1 is a successor ordinal, then (h, at−1, at−1, . . .) ∈
Pξ(h) \W . If ξ < at−1 and at−1 is a limit ordinal, then (h, ρ, ρ, . . .) ∈
Pξ(h) \W for every successor ordinal ρ satisfying ξ + 1 ≤ ρ < at−1.
(b) If ξ ≥ at−1 then Pξ(h) ⊆W .
5To simplify notations, we denote the initial history by h1 = (a0).
6In this case, it makes no difference which player is the active player.
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In particular, this will imply that ξ∗ = a0 = τ . The proof of the claim is by
transfinite induction on ξ.
For ξ = 1, the claim is obvious.
Assume that the claim holds for some ordinal ξ. We will now prove the claim
for ξ + 1.
Suppose that ξ + 1 < at−1. If at−1 is a successor ordinal, then whichever
action at ∈ {at−1, at−1 − 1} player I chooses, we have ξ < at, and therefore the
induction hypothesis implies that Pξ(h, at)\W is non-empty. Hence, αξ+1(h) =
0 and (h, at−1, at−1, . . .) ∈ Pξ+1(h) \W . If at−1 is a limit ordinal, since player
II can choose any successor ordinal ρ satisfying ξ + 1 ≤ ρ < at−1, we obtain
(h, ρ, ρ, . . .) ∈ Pξ+1(h) \W .
Suppose that ξ + 1 ≥ at−1. If ξ ≥ at−1 then, by the induction hypothesis
and because the sequence (Pρ(h))ρ is monotonic non-increasing (by inclusion),
we obtain Pξ+1(h) ⊆ Pξ(h) ⊆ W . Assume then that ξ + 1 = at−1. Since
player I can choose the action at = ξ, and since Pξ(h, ξ) ⊆ W by the induction
hypothesis, it follows that Pξ+1(h) ⊆W .
Finally, let ξ be a limit ordinal, and assume that the claim holds for all
ordinals λ < ξ. If either ξ < at−1 or ξ > at−1 then the respective parts of
the claim for ξ follow by (5). Suppose then that ξ = at−1 and take any play
p ∈ Pξ(h). We will show that p ∈ W . Let at denote the action in p right after
h. Since p ∈ Pξ(h) and at < ξ, we have p ∈ Pat+1(h), and hence p ∈ Pat(h, at).
By the induction hypothesis, p ∈W as desired.
4.2 Other applications of the technique
The driving force behind the proof is the following property, that holds in games
with perfect information. Denote by h the current finite history. Suppose that
for every possible action a, v(h, a) is the minimal continuation payoff possible
for the decision maker at h if he chooses a, and suppose that if the decision
maker chooses the action a0, he is supposed to get a payoff x which is at least
maxa∈A v(h, a). Then even if the decision maker at h will eventually receive a
payoff higher than x after playing a0 at h, one can construct a strategy profile
that ensures that he plays a0, and is punished by v(h, a) otherwise.
This property does not hold, e.g., for mixed equilibria in sequential games
with simultaneous moves, because in such games, if the continuation payoffs
change, then the set of mixed equilibria may change as well, and a deviation
from the original mixed equilibrium may not be detected.
The property does hold for extensive-form correlated equilibria in games with
simultaneous moves. In this type of equilibrium, a mediator sends a private
signal to each player at every stage. If the signal contains a recommended
action for the current stage, as well as the recommendations made to all players
in the previous stage, then a deviation from the recommendation is detected
immediately and can be punished. We hope that our approach can be used to
prove the existence of an extensive-form correlated equilibrium in multi-player
Borel games with simultaneous moves.
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4.3 Tightness of the result
It is well known that a 0-equilibrium, and therefore also a subgame-perfect 0-
equilibrium, may fail to exist when the range of the payoff functions is not
finite.
As the following example shows, when there are infinitely many players, a
subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium need not exist even when the range of the payoff
functions is finite. Suppose that the set of players is the set N of natural
numbers, and the set of actions is A = {a, b}. Each player t ∈ N plays only
once, at stage t. The payoff of player t is 1 if he played b, 2 if he played a
and some player j > t played b, and 0 if he played a and every player j > t
also played a. We claim that there is no subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in this
game. Suppose to the contrary that σ is a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium. Since
every player can guarantee 1 by simply playing action b, it cannot happen in
any subgame that σ prescribes for all further players to play action a. This
means in particular that, with respect to σ, infinitely many players play action
b, and receive 1. But then each of those players is better off by deviating to a
and receiving 2.
4.4 Chance moves
Borel games are deterministic, and the sequence of actions chosen by the players
uniquely determines the outcome. In many situations there are chance moves
along the game, where actions are chosen according to a known probability
distribution. This situation is equivalent to the case where there is an additional
player who follows a specific non-deterministic strategy, whatever the other
players play. There are indications that our proof can be adapted to this more
general situation, and this will be done elsewhere.
4.5 Positive recursive Borel games
Recursive Borel games are games where some finite histories are terminating,
in the sense that once they occur the payoff is determined (and the play that
follows them does not affect the players’ payoffs), and the payoff of every infinite
(non-terminating) play is 0. Various positional games that are studied in the
computer science literature have this form. The significance of this class of
games to game theory was exhibited in the context of stochastic games by Vieille
(2000a,b), who used it as a step to proving the existence of an equilibrium payoff
in every two-player stochastic game. A recursive Borel game is called positive
if the terminal payoffs are positive for both players.
Flesch et al. (2010) studied positive recursive Borel game with finitely many
states; these are positional games that are played on a finite directed graph,
where each vertex is controlled by some player, and when the game reaches
some vertex, the controlling player can choose whether to terminate the game,
or whether to continue the game by choosing one of the edges that leaves the
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vertex. The terminal payoff, which is positive for all players, depends only on
the vertex where termination occurred, and not on the whole past play.
Flesch et al. (2010) prove that every such game admits a subgame-perfect 0-
equilibrium.7 In their proof, they define for every vertex s a sequence (αk(s))k∈N
that is similar to our sequence (αξ(h))ξ, they prove that this sequence is non-
decreasing, and, because there are finitely many vertices, they deduce that there
is k∗ ∈ N such that αk∗+1(s) = αk∗(s) for every vertex s. They then use a
similar construction of the subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium as the one that we
used.
In Borel games every history is a different vertex. Therefore one needs to
employ a much more delicate construction, that differs from the one in Flesch
et al. (2010) in two respects. First, when the number of vertices is infinite,
there need not be k∗ ∈ N such that αk∗+1(s) = αk∗(s) for every vertex s, and
therefore (αξ(h))ξ should be defined for every ordinal. Second, since play never
terminates, one has to deal with plays of infinite length and introduce the sets
(Pξ(h))ξ.
It turns out that for positive recursive Borel games our construction can
be simplified, and a single odd iteration is sufficient to show that Pξ(h) is not
empty for limit ordinals ξ.
4.6 Borel games with general payoffs
Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003) shows that without the condition that pay-
offs are lower-semi-continuous, a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium need not exist.
However, Solan and Vieille (2003) show that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium
does exist if one allows behavior strategies. The existence of a subgame-perfect
ε-equilibrium in behavior strategies was proved in other setups where the payoff
functions are not lower-semi-continuous, see, e.g., Solan (2005) and Mashiah-
Yaakovi (2009).
In our proof, the lower-semi-continuity of the payoff functions was used only
in the last part, to show that any deviation σj that differs from σj∗ infinitely
many times cannot be profitable, as soon as any deviation σj that differs from
σj∗ finitely many times is not profitable. We do not know how the proof should
be adapted to handle general payoff functions.
In fact, the following example shows that our definition of αξ and Pξ is not
appropriate for general Borel games. Consider a two-player Borel game with
A = {a, b}. The payoff functions of the two players are as follows:
Condition u1(h) u2(h)
Both players played b finitely many times 2 2
Only player 1 played b finitely many times 2 1
Only player 2 played b finitely many times 1 2
No player played b finitely many times 0 0
7When transitions are random, Flesch et al. (2010) prove the existence of a subgame-
perfect ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
18
Note that u1 and u2 are not lower-semi-continuous. Playing b finitely many
times is a dominant strategy for both players, so that the unique subgame-
perfect 0-equilibrium payoff is (2, 2). However, one can verify that for every
finite history h and every ordinal ξ, Pξ(h) contains all plays in which at least
one player plays b finitely many times, so that the Folk Theorem, Theorem 18,
does not hold, and our construction of the subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in the
proof of Theorem 9 is invalid.
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